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This is the second part of the paper on the problem of demarcation between the dimensions of natural 
and the human sciences in contemporary cosmology. Here we explicate further the sense of some 
cosmology’s claims in the perspective of philosophical phenomenology. The observation that in 
cosmology the subject of cosmological research and its “object” are inseparable is linked to such a 
feature of cosmology as its untestability. We discuss the sense of reality assigned to cosmological theories 
in the conditions of untestability and propose a hypothesis that theoretical cosmology operates along 
the lines of principles related to coherence of epistemic justification of its theories. Correspondingly 
the sense of reality changes by making an inseparable link between humanity and the sense of the 
universe more explicit. Finally the paper explicates in detail the sense of the interplay between natural 
and human sciences’ dimensions in cosmology by appealing to a sort of calm in promoting of a definite 
ontological commitment in cosmology. It appeals to a dispassionate phenomenological description of 
the universe as it discloses itself in the natural attitude, in the language of causes on the one hand and 
in the language of intentional immanence through communion on the other hand. Hence the conclusion 
is made that the objective of a philosophical insight in cosmology, is not to find a unified language for 
understanding the universe, but rather to realise that in our approach to its totality, always initiated 
in the life-world, we progress by the various ways given to humanity. The reality of the universe then 
is much more than is met by the discursive mind, it forms a mysterious sense of “identity”, which is 
intuited, but never completely grasped by the mind: it bedazzles us, while constituting our own sense 
of identity to the extent that we cannot circumscribe the universe in the rubrics of thought. The “I” of 
a cosmologist is constituted exactly to the extent this “I” cannot comprehend the universe. 
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subjectivity
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The dilemma of the object-noematic  
and act-noetic: the paradox of subjectivity  
and cosmology’s untestability
The problem of the interplay between the 
two dimensions, natural and the human, in 
cosmological discourse has it origin in a simple 
paradox belonging to perennial philosophy but 
polished within a phenomenological stream 
of thought, namely, that the universe of the 
physical cosmology is produced by means of 
special intellectual operations rooted in the 
life world and thus is specifically different 
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from the latter, at the same time, the universe 
apparently proves to be part and parcel of the 
life world (Gurwitsch, 1974, p. 147). In other 
words, on the one hand the physical universe, 
as an “object” of the natural and scientific 
constitution, is different from and alien to 
the human world thus exceeding the human 
reality itself; on the other hand, being a mental 
accomplishment, the universe exhibits itself 
as cultural reality thus being contained within 
the life world. On the one hand, humanity’s 
position in the universe, interpreted through 
the natural sciences, is such that humanity is 
contained by the universe, that is humanity, 
through physical embodiment, is subjected to 
the necessities of physics and biology. On the 
other hand, the universe as being articulated in 
human perceptual and intellectual experience 
is contained in human subjectivity so that 
humanity is treated as a transcendental subject, 
that is as a free intentional agency, whose 
personal consciousness cannot be accounted 
through or reduced to the physical and thus 
“naturally” belongs to the enquiry of the human 
sciences. In spite of this paradox physics sees 
as its task the development of the theory of 
the universe in which conscious humanity 
would be a product of the universe’s law-like-
necessities. In this case the paradox would be 
removed because the foundation of a scientific 
explanation of the universe (as a mode of 
humanity’s existence) would be part of the 
universe itself. If cosmology could sustain this 
ideal then it would prove its right to be qualified 
as a natural science in the strict sense. In this 
case the universe will be treated as an external 
object with no influence from the presence of 
humanity. Can cosmology, in fact, sustain this 
ideal? In order to answer this question let us, 
for a start, analyse one particular aspect in the 
object-noematic interpretation of cosmology 
related to its lack of testability. 
In the conclusion to his survey of 
philosophical issues of modern cosmology, 
George Ellis stated the thesis that uncertainty 
constitutes a key aspect of cosmology: “scientific 
exploration can tell us much about the universe 
but not about its ultimate nature, or even much 
about some of its major geometrical and physical 
characteristics. Some of this uncertainty may be 
resolved, but much will remain. Cosmological 
theory should acknowledge this uncertainty” 
(Ellis, 2007, p. 1274; emphasis added). It seems 
that what is implied here is a distinction between 
“the universe” as it appears through study and 
construction by a cosmologist and that which can 
be termed as the ultimate, underlying sense of its 
contingent facticity (givenness). The uncertainty 
of cosmology lies in the fact that it is functioning 
in the framework of what is already given but, 
nevertheless, incapable to account for its own 
possibility as a fact of life.1 Unlike other sciences 
(with respect to which one can assert a similar 
thing, namely that they do not account for their 
own foundations), cosmology has a particular 
status because it pretends to deal with the unique 
and all-encompassing object – the universe as 
a whole which, by definition, includes not only 
what is observed here and now (that is in a 
particular spatial location – home place – and in 
a particular historical period), but that totality to 
which human thinking assigns the sense of reality 
independent of space and time (this totality as a 
generic mathematical view can have a sense of 
a Platonic idea, thus being devoid of space-time 
propensities). Correspondingly, its intended 
object, that is the universe as a whole, cannot be 
constituted as accomplished here and now but, 
on the contrary, represents an asymptotic ideal 
reached through a self-correcting advance of 
knowing. In approaching this ideal cosmology 
invokes many ideas and intuitions (related to 
constructs and theories) introduced on the level 
of cosmologists’ intentionality (supported by 
– 646 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk. Cosmology at the Crossroads of Natural and Human Sciences: is Demarcation Possible?
beliefs, such as, for example, in explainability 
of the universe) and not under the pressure of 
evidence based on empirically accessed physical 
causality. Thus, naturally, these ideas cannot be 
tested on the level of physical causality, and are, 
probably, untestable in principle in a finite span 
of time.2 
The accentuation of uncertainty and 
untestability by Ellis can give the impression 
that cosmology, in those parts which do not refer 
to direct astronomical observations, is not what 
is usually classed as a “natural science”. For the 
natural sciences it is typical to bring unknown 
aspects of nature to their explicit presence 
which is confirmed by observations and tests. 
Theories typical for the natural sciences aim 
to refer to empirical reality by means of rules 
of correspondence, that is through tests and 
procedures established by scientific community 
and accessible to the public comprehension on 
the grounds of common sense. Mathematisation 
plays an important role in a theoretical advance 
of the natural sciences, but mathematics, 
associated by its historical origin with the 
natural sciences, remains a tool, a method, 
ultimately created from within the conditions 
of the life world in order to appropriate this 
world further through articulation and by means 
of theoretical thematisation.3 The aim of the 
natural sciences is to explain facts by arranging 
them in the framework of physical causality as a 
sort of human control. 
If now cosmology is perceived (in the spirit 
of Ellis) as an enterprise which bases itself in 
non-testable assumptions, there is a question that 
arises on the general sense of this enterprise and 
validity of its epistemic claims. Do cosmological 
theories indeed deal with physical reality, posed as 
existing in itself, so that cosmological constructs 
provide a set of convergent approximations to it? 
Or does, alternatively, cosmology, being a mode 
of cultural activity, just create an intellectual 
environment with a corresponding narrative on 
humanity’s place in the universe without any 
ontological commitment? It seems reasonable to 
conjecture in this case that any narrative about 
the universe is based on empirical extrapolations 
and intellectual conjectures which in some cases 
are untestable now and some are untestable 
in principle. Nevertheless, these untestable 
conjectures contribute to the wholeness of 
the narrative thus becoming indispensable 
constituents of the idea of the universe. The 
natural origin of these conjectures is related 
to their historical contingency which entails 
cosmology’s positive incertitude and thus the 
“natural” presence in it of some untestable or 
eventually falsifiable and theoretically redundant 
statements.4 
The problem is that by its definition the 
universe as a whole cannot be thought as a 
contingent “formation”(unless in a theological 
sense as created out of nothing) because it assumes 
a spatio-temporal totality which as such exceeds 
any contingency in terms of space and time. This 
invokes a conflict with the historical contingency 
of cosmology as activity of knowing. The question 
is: can the historically contingent discipline of 
cosmology (as related to contingent events of 
human subjectivity) pretend to encompass the 
universe as a whole which, by definition, exceeds 
all spatially distinct realms and eras and thus all 
aspects of contingent givenness. 
The historical contingency of cosmological 
facts can be easily illustrated. By studying 
astronomical objects through their image 
in the two-dimensional celestial sphere we 
study de facto free phenomena, that is those 
which contain in themselves or establish from 
themselves the reasons for their being given 
to us. Their contingent facticity consists in 
that they are related to historically concrete 
and individual acts of consciousness. Their 
appearance is free from any underlying causes in 
– 647 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk. Cosmology at the Crossroads of Natural and Human Sciences: is Demarcation Possible?
the following sense. Astronomical observations 
can be interpreted as caused by the contingent 
factors of human history; however, one cannot 
construct a trans-historical “trajectory of 
knowledge” as if it would be driven by a sort of 
law in the “space” of all possible knowledge and 
which as a potential possibility led to the given 
outcome of observations. Or, in different words, 
one cannot assume the existence of a universal 
“observer” which could anticipate the path of 
knowledge independently and apart from the 
acts of knowing as their first time happening. 
Knowledge and experience are accumulated in 
consequent observations in time from different 
perspectives where the conditions of knowledge, 
the very fashion in which this knowledge is 
collected, are not controlled by us; we do not 
know all factors which influence the course of 
that existential manifestation which is called 
“knowledge”.5 This rephrases the sense of the 
contingency of knowledge as that process which 
is not exhausted or driven only by its subject 
matter: the choice of what to observe (or whether 
to observe or not) and of the notions for the 
description of the universe is based not in fully 
understood physical laws and interconnections, 
but remains hanging within the free intentionality 
of researchers. Correspondingly the untestable 
conjectures naturally contribute to this 
intentionality. Untestability of some conjectures 
about the universe thus reflects the contingency 
of the conditions of constitution of cosmology’s 
“object”, the process which is not one-to-one 
related to the causal developments in the object 
of knowledge and sources of experience.6 The 
uncertainty of cosmology witnesses to the 
fact that the intentional acts of cosmological 
research which allegedly attempt to reveal 
causality in physical processes do not lead to 
the fulfilment of intentions and this constitutes 
an irreplaceable and unavoidable feature of any 
attempt of knowing the universe as a whole. 
There are some elements in the sociology of 
cosmology which can be treated similarly to the 
work of a proper historian.7 The cosmological 
narrative can receive a historical interpretation 
which vindicates in a different way the presence of 
untestable elements in cosmology. For example, 
by studying the history of astronomy (as a certain 
introduction into cosmology proper) one must 
take a neutral position with respect to epistemic 
claims of Ptolemy or Giordano Bruno. Certainly 
from a modern view their cosmologies were 
incomplete and contained untestable elements. 
But a historical perspective stops us from such 
an evaluation, accepting, rejecting or amending 
their epistemic claims concerning the knowledge 
of the universe unless we evaluate their theories 
through the eyes of the present era, and our 
understanding of history is fundamentally 
conditioned by present scientific views. The 
same perspective can be applied to modern 
cosmology. Indeed, if cosmology is seen as an 
ongoing narration (as intrinsically historical and 
hence contingent) about the universe, then the 
presence in its structures of untestable elements 
as well as overall uncertainty cannot be used 
to qualify for the epistemic unfoundedness of 
cosmology. On the contrary these untestable 
elements should be seen as cultural artefacts 
which must be accepted as existential events, 
that is as historically motivated actions. Then 
one must abstain from judgements on the truth 
of cosmology’s epistemic claims and keep 
neutrality with respect to them. In this case the 
presence of untestable hypotheses in cosmology 
can be treated as inevitable. From the point 
of view of physics this can be a misfortune, 
but seen philosophically this turns out to be a 
characteristic of the human condition in which 
knowledge of the universe takes place. 
The narrative about the universe which 
contains untestable propositions, being 
historical, is subject to ongoing change and 
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renewal (in terms of the research practice this 
means that theories change rapidly and the 
survival of theories against the flow of data (that 
is testable propositions), let’s say within two 
years, is treated as its success). In cosmology, 
especially related to ultimate questions (such as 
the origin and end of the universe, as well as 
multiverse), this renewal does not only follow 
the logic of revealing new causal connections 
among facts of nature (because nature is simply 
inaccessible), but is driven by intentionality 
which reflects the aspirations and advances 
of the human spirit, its “infinite tasks” in 
grasping the sense of existence.8 In this sense 
some conjectures about the untestable aspects 
of the universe as a whole (being acts of free 
human will rather than necessities imposed by 
the logic of nature) represent existential events 
(manifestations and assertions of that which does 
not present itself through physical causation, 
that is elements of intentions, motivations and 
goals of a historical cosmologist-actor), through 
which personal experiences and intuitions of 
belonging to the universe attempt to express 
themselves outwardly in the scientific narrative.9 
Cosmological narrative thus appeals to the idea 
of a wider cosmic context, beyond this planet, 
by shifting home places not only in the visible 
space, but beyond it, towards the intelligible 
universe. This happens at the expense of leaving 
out the sphere of the empirical and sensible 
experience and making a transition to stable and 
allegedly non-corruptible intelligible entities 
which are inevitably beyond the reach of any 
straightforward testability. In some extreme 
versions of such a narrative its apologists appeal 
for the removal of all “human baggage” behind 
the underlying theories.10 It then seems obvious 
that in this tendency the grain of untestability 
and the lack of correspondence with physical 
reality is posited in the very inception of the 
non-egocentric aspirations of cosmology. Put 
another way, untestability becomes an explicit 
manifestation of the incommensurability 
between man and the universe resulting in an 
unavoidable positive incertitude of cosmological 
knowledge. It is this incommensurability that is 
characteristically revealed through an attempt 
to construct a full computational synthesis 
of the universe.11 The totality of the universe 
and its actual infinity, being the source of the 
incommensurability, is, however, not beyond 
its reach in the sense of manifestation. To the 
extent, therefore, that a particular cosmological 
theory is functioning adequately even in the 
conditions of untestability one can regard the 
structure which it articulates as constituting the 
intelligible pattern of the universe as a whole. 
Remembering, however, that this intelligible 
pattern never exhausts the ultimate sense of that 
which is intended as the universe, the untestability 
demonstrates itself as the constituting element 
of the apophatic intelligibility of the infinite 
universe. 
Cosmology cannot avoid dealing with 
hardly testable conjectures just because it is 
not an experimental science: according to Ellis’ 
theses “The universe itself cannot be subjected 
to physical experimentation” and “The universe 
cannot be observationally compared with 
other universes”.12 In this sense the presence 
of speculative mathematical elements which 
cannot be directly related to empirical reality 
must be accepted with a sort of humility, and 
in no way as the end of realistic commitment 
in research, assuming that reality stands here 
not for a pre-existent antecedent entity, but as 
being unceasingly constituted. The persistent 
absence of the physical correlate to that which is 
intuited through mathematics rather represents 
an invitation to continue the scientific quest 
when the reality of what is called the universe is 
withdrawn from a simplistic empirical grasp. The 
presence of unattained goals, as imaginatively 
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projected standards, encourages and activates 
in a scientist a different intentionality which is 
based on existential inspirations and not fully 
articulated insights.13 The initiation of this 
intentionality allows a philosopher to appropriate 
cosmology not as that type of knowing which 
delivers ultimate truth about reality but rather 
as a particular account of the human encounter 
with the universe. In this case the demand for 
cosmology follows from existential orientation, 
that is from asserting the sense of human 
existence and its telos.14 Correspondingly the 
introduction of untestable conjectures points 
rather to mechanisms of functioning of human 
subjectivity when it faces phenomena which 
exceed their capacity of constitution. This in 
turn contributes to a generic thesis that the study 
of the universe contributes toward the study of 
man.15 Cosmology can be seen as revealing the 
structures of human subjectivity in the case of 
incommensurable phenomena thus explicating 
the general functioning of this subjectivity as 
embodied in the universe.16 
By making explicit the workings of human 
corporeal subjectivity cosmology places itself 
within the cultural world thus exhibiting some 
features of the cultural and human sciences, in 
particular, along the lines argued by Husserl: 
namely that the cultural or human sciences reveal 
themselves as all-encompassing, since they also 
comprise the natural sciences and mathematised 
nature since it is itself a mental accomplishment, 
that is, a cultural phenomenon.17 Cosmology 
acquires the meaning of a cultural science in the 
sense that it deals not only with the disclosure of 
“objective” reality of the universe (as humanity’s 
natural environment) but encodes human 
aspirations to disclose the sense of its place in 
the universe, for example, by measuring the 
universe through the standard of human life.18 
It is in this sense that cosmology exhibits itself 
not as a monological questioning of the universe 
as if it was out there, but rather as a dialogue 
with the universe as a noematic pole through 
which humanity enquires of itself.19 The fact 
that this noematic pole is not fixed and escapes 
its ultimate grasp constitutes a particular feature 
of the cosmological enquiry in which persons as 
centres of disclosure are formed, as disclosers, to 
the extent the universe discloses itself. The ego’s 
subjectivity is evolving through the invitation 
by the universe to disclose it in certain limits. 
Thus there is no independent object of disclosure, 
independent of those who are participating in the 
“dynamics” of this disclosure.20 Correspondingly 
one intuits the universe as related to the 
continuity of human conscious experience of 
embodiment in the universe. Seen in this way, 
cosmology could acquire a teleological sense if 
one relates it to humanity’s “infinite tasks” of 
dealing with questions of the beginning and the 
end of the universe as having connotations with 
enquiries into the sense of its own beginning 
and its own consummation. It is because of the 
infinitude of these tasks that human subjectivity 
while attempting to comprehend the sense of 
the beginning and the end of the universe, is 
forming and comprehending itself. It is through 
the unlimited donation of the universe (as the 
field of possibilities) that humanity awakens to 
its own finitude in spite of a potentially infinite 
consciousness (based in the infinite human will), 
that is to the issue of the “beginning” and “end” 
of consciousness itself, that is, its contingent 
facticity. This sense of finitude entails another 
mode of incommensurability, that is the infinite 
can only be represented through symbols 
(apophaticism) which by their origin function 
not on the level of physical causality.21 In this 
sense cosmological theorising as an ongoing 
symbolising the universe contains in itself logic 
and necessities which are not directly related to 
its subject matter, but rather to the sense of goals 
of humanity itself. 
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Cosmology and human will
In the background of what we have said 
so far there still remains a question (related to 
Ellis’ comments on the presence of untestable 
and unprovable assumptions in cosmology) as 
to why in spite of the a-priori understanding 
that cosmology will never achieve the fullness 
of explanatory power and adequacy with 
truth, the urge for cosmological search and 
narration continues. Indeed, even for a reader 
unexperienced in all the subtleties of the 
methodology of science the claim that cosmology 
is based in a fundamental uncertainty must 
make a staggering impression, that cosmology 
formed an exotic set of trans-scientific ideas and 
intuitions which, by virtue of popular science 
and mass culture, acquired the status of a stable 
social belief. However, cosmology is not a new 
mythology22 or a kind of cosmic philosophy23 
(based on wishes and remote expectations of 
community), it is not a sheer imagination, but 
has its own logic and drive, which, reflects the 
sense and value (as well as telos) of communion 
with the universe conditioned by necessities 
of nature and, at the same time, pertaining to 
human freedom. This communion is rather a 
state of apatheia as transcending over the natural 
causes which are beyond human control and. At 
the same time, communion with the universe 
is the immanence to the universe through the 
sheer fact of human presence, through which 
the universe is transformed by human will, its 
energeia and operations of cognition. Thus the 
persistence of cosmological research comes not 
only from the logic of cosmological research, 
but from other factors originating in the human 
condition.24 Indeed, finite human beings, because 
of their paradoxical standing in the universe are 
not content with the presence of things in the 
universe as they are given in their empirically 
contingent facticity. Cosmologists, by invoking 
the idea of the universe as a whole, manifest 
their desire to understand the meaning of finite 
things (let us say astronomically observed 
objects or earthly phenomena) not only through 
their nature (that is through that which is 
subjected to physical causation), but through the 
purposes and ends of these things as they stand 
with respect to the universe as their ultimate 
foundation. But this intentionality directed into 
the foundations of the very facticity of things 
is not what can only be expressed outwardly in 
terms of physical causation (and thus subject to 
tests); it is sustained by humanity’s aspirations 
not only to be commensurable to the universe 
but, in fact to be above it, to transcend it and 
thus to encompass it through the power of 
intellect rooted in human will. It is because of 
its paradoxical position in being which causes 
existential discomfort25 that humanity appeals 
to the idea of the universe as a whole as an 
alternative to being contained by finite natures, 
that is being comprehended only as an “object” 
among other objects in the universe. Existentially 
it does not want to be manipulated through 
circumscribability and individualisation which 
are inherent in spatio-temporal forms of the 
finite cosmos and correspondingly long for the 
truth of their existence in the space-time rubrics 
of this universe as if it is not of the universe as it 
appears to us. Here humanity wants to recognise 
things not according to their compelling 
givenness, but as results of humanity’s free 
will realised in its intentionality. This naturally 
leads to the transcendence of the empirical and 
the invocation of intelligible entities (sometimes 
untestable and unprovable) which serves as a 
pointer and invitation to further research rather 
than its end and ultimate certainty.26 The presence 
of agents with free will in the universe imposes 
certain constraints on the nature of the universe: 
it must contain the necessary conditions for them 
to exist27 (or, as argued elsewhere, the universe 
must be moral28). 
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The perception of cosmology as that 
block of insights which involves deeply human 
anxieties and correspondingly persists as an 
existential quest, invokes a different stance 
on the ontological commitment exercised by 
advocates of cosmology, all those who are 
engaged in its popularisation and adoration and 
who usually claim, that whatever is theoretically 
and mathematically formulated, is physically 
real and true, although non-observable and 
untestable.29 The countersense which is put 
forward by the human sense of cosmology doubts 
not the legitimacy of the cosmological narrative 
(comprising theories of non-observable entities) 
per se but the validity of epistemic justification 
adopted for its realistic interpretation. 
Indeed, if many cosmological hypotheses 
and inferences are not testable, that is the 
correspondence principle between theory and 
empirical reality as epistemic justification 
does not work, there is a way of interpreting 
cosmological propositions about the non-
observable and invisible by assigning to the 
universe the sense of a mental accomplishment 
but achieved through the idea of coherence 
(Rescher, 1989, pp. 318-9) where “coherence” 
stands most of all not for the clarity of theoretical 
explication and cohesion of mathematical 
calculations, but for the “collaborative 
agreement”(Ibid., p. 333) among cosmologists. 
It is these cosmologists who, by exercising their 
will, effectively hypostasise the notion of truth 
related to the universe and postulate the ways 
of epistemic justification which lead to it.30 In 
this case the implied truth of cosmology cannot 
be an ontological truth (that is physical truth 
as allegedly existing in itself) but is a human-
dependent constitution of truth possessing 
the qualities related to the corporeality of 
human beings.31 In this interpretation many 
cosmological constructions naturally acquire 
the status of coherent mental accomplishments 
(based in beliefs) whose truth (being historically 
contingent) contributes towards the spiritual 
goals (telos) of community but obviously does 
not exhaust them. However, the question of 
whether the locally established truths are subject 
to convergence to ultimate truth remains beyond 
scientific scope and represents in turn a belief 
motivated by trans-scientific convictions. In 
this option the validity of cosmology’s claims is 
dictated not by a direct reference to reality but 
through the adoption of a consistent and creative 
set of beliefs which themselves constitute the 
sense of reality, although contingent as related 
to the goals of community of cosmologists.32 
Since in thus treated cosmology the universe 
appears to be a collaborative construction, its 
knowledge cannot be treated as independent of 
human insight, so that cosmology’s alleged status 
of following the standards of a natural science 
(as that in which the “object” of study can be 
entirely separated or detached from the subject) is 
not achievable. Cosmology, in contradistinction 
with astronomy and astrophysics33, is rather the 
“universology” (Jaki, 1993, pp. 1-2) which deals 
with a single, unique totality of all, which not 
only cannot be treated as an object and hence 
subjected to experimentation, but also cannot 
be made devoid of the delimiters of human 
insight. This, as we mentioned before, implies 
that human beings, as part of the universe, 
cannot position the universe as a whole in 
front of their consciousness, unless as a mental 
abstraction.34 If such a mentally constructed 
universe nevertheless were to be identified with 
the physical totality, this would imply a sort of 
impossible transcendence of the actual physical 
universe as if one were able to “look at it” from the 
outside and hence transcending one’s embodied 
existence.35 The inseparability of humanity 
and the universe as their consubstantiality 
entails that all speculations about other worlds 
remain intrinsically immanent, being noematic 
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correlates of embodied subjectivity which is an 
irreducible element of being of this universe.36 
Thus the universe as an intentional correlate of 
cosmological consciousness represents a mental 
accomplishment and cultural achievement37 
exhibiting features of the sciences of human 
affaires.38 
The explication  
of the interplay between natural  
and human sciences in cosmology
Let us articulate further the sense of the 
interplay between the elements of human and 
natural sciences in cosmology. Cosmology is a 
scientific activity of human beings: it is because 
of this that in its constitution it is a human science 
in a trivial sense.39 This claim comes from a noetic 
pole and implies that the epistemic and socially 
significant achievements of cosmology just are 
cognitive and manipulative achievements of 
human beings.40 To say that “cosmology is human 
science” is to say that the doing of cosmology is 
an existential characteristic of human beings, 
their mode of being-in-the-world. 
However, if one looks at the interplay 
from the point of view of their noematic poles, 
one must admit that the difference between 
them is always understood in terms of the 
radically distinct object domains outlined by 
the faculties of cognition. The natural sciences 
are characterised by the conviction that their 
subject matter is always “an object”, and, in 
particular, a non-human object (whose principle 
of existence is not related to subjectivity and 
personhood), so that its reading does not require 
any mutual agreement or reciprocity apart 
from common substance based connotations 
(consubstantiality).41 It is in this sense that if 
cosmology pretends to be consistently a natural 
science, it must fulfil the major requirement: the 
“object” of cosmology (allegedly the universe as 
a whole) must be “at distance” from subjects of 
knowledge and thus, in a way, to be inhuman, 
whose contingent existence manifests itself from 
itself, and not conditioned by the constituting 
human subjectivity that is devoid of the noetic 
carriers.42 However, this demand creates tension 
with the fact that the very constitution of any 
object is performed by a particular operation 
of reason, which in spite of its imposing 
detachment from an object still remains behind it. 
Correspondingly the noetic pole in predications 
of the universe can be removed only in particular 
applications of cosmology (its astronomical part) 
desiring to deal with particular distinct physical 
objects which do not have immediate impact 
on being of man, namely remote planets, stars 
or galaxies. Such objects are characterised by 
persistent identity through a span of historical 
time and their appearance in human experience 
is not a construction, but an empirical fact. It 
is this identity which gives them the status 
of objectively existent entities. Contrary to 
these, some cosmological “objects” are simply 
constructions because they are observed as 
wholes only from this particular location and 
cannot be treated as objects independently of 
this fact: this applies first of all to clusters of 
galaxies which consist of “galaxies”, which 
are at different distances from us and thus at 
different times (with respect to us), so that the 
question of the status of the cluster of galaxies as 
a distant and distinct “object” with fixed spatio-
temporal characteristics (this is usually implied 
in physics and natural sciences) does not have 
sense – this “object” is a mental construction.43 
While introducing a construct of a “cluster” 
of galaxies on the basis of the manifested 
phenomena, a different intentionality is invoked 
which unifies different aspects of this “cluster” 
(different galaxies which do not exhibit directly 
any physical causation) in one “physical object” 
assigning to it such existence as if it is based on 
physical interaction (causation) of its parts. Here 
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one can see that the language of intentionality 
(pertaining to the human sciences) cascades 
towards the language of physical causes 
(pertaining to the natural sciences). This shows 
that the ideal of the natural sciences is not only 
problematic on the scale of the whole universe, 
but, in fact, on the scale of its “elementary 
constituents” such as clusters of galaxies.44 
What happens then is that the same shift 
from intentionality to causality takes place in 
creating the idea of the universe as a whole, when 
the appearance of filaments of clusters of galaxies 
through observations and conscious articulation 
is referred to the universe as a whole understood 
as a singular entity allegedly unified on the 
basis of physical causality. Here the language of 
intentions (in this case a belief in existence of the 
overall physical totality) is transformed into the 
language of physical causality. The intention is 
to unify (on the basis of a successive theoretical 
synthesis) the empirical images of causally 
disconnected regions in the sky in one single 
whole. But this unification naturally cannot be 
achieved as an accomplished phenomenalisation; 
for if the thus constructed unity is formulated, 
it cannot be phenomenalised simply because it 
does not belong to the same series of empirical 
appearances which were passed over by the 
theoretical synthesis. Such a synthesis distances 
itself from the contingently given appearances 
towards a simplified mathematical construction 
thus explaining away the problem of contingent 
givenness of it empirical references (a typical 
example is the cosmological principle which 
equates all positions in space thus making 
irrelevant the question on the contingency of 
the empirical display as it is given to us here 
and now: the universe is uniform and the same 
display would be in any position in space). 
Correspondingly, such a construct, represented 
by a global space-time diagram, being a logical 
digest of the variety of appearances reveals itself 
as poor in intuitive donation in the same sense as 
all mathematical constructions are: it effectively 
does not produce any growth of knowledge 
apart from stating that we belong to the whole. 
Consequently the construct of the universe as 
a whole, while contributing to the constitution 
of the universe, does not explain the facticity 
of this particular constitution as contributing 
toward the facticity of the universe in general. 
Even less does it provide us with any insight 
on the physical causality in this whole. But it 
is this causality which is the object of desire of 
cosmologists. Unable to address this causality 
as being beyond phenomenalisation at present, 
cosmology makes its intentional objective that 
of producing a model where the unity of “all in 
all” in the universe would be explained in terms 
of physical causality but related to the past of 
the universe (where all causally disjoint regions 
were unified).45 The move of thought is quite clear 
here: to assert the unity of the universe in terms 
of its absolute origin, that is to introduce physical 
causality among its presently contingent displays 
by referring them back to the point where “all 
was in all”, that is physically connected simply 
through its belonging to “one and the same” 
(consubstantiality through origination). Thus the 
introduction of the idea of the evolving universe, 
being certainly supported by all known evidences 
from observational astronomy, and the shift 
to the past of the universe in order to interpret 
its contingent present, manifests an epistemic 
causation from “intentions” to “physical 
causes”. 
Such a unification of all different aspects 
of the universe appearances in one “original” 
substance implies, however, not causal connection 
based on physical processes (contemporary 
cosmology is clear about the fact that the 
universe consists of space-time disconnected 
sections46); here one means connectedness as 
belonging to the underlying foundation (be it 
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the overall encompassing space-time structure 
or substance), as consubstantiality of everything 
in the universe as a whole.47 It is this type of 
consubstantiality that is implied when in some 
textbooks on cosmology the universe, containing 
according to relativity infinitely many causally 
disconnecting regions, is depicted in a single 
diagram meant to symbolise the totality of all.48 
Unlike a consubstantiality related to micro-
particles constituting all physical objects, the 
large-scale cosmological consubstantiality does 
not have a clear image-like representation apart 
from mental diagrams. Thus this consubstantiality 
has rather a transcendental character referring to 
the conditions of knowledge of the universe as a 
whole. Correspondingly this consubstantiality is 
a product of intentionality which, in cosmology, 
cascades towards physical causality as cosmology 
desires to assign to this consubstantiality an 
explicit physical meaning. It is not difficult to 
grasp that the transition from the language of 
intentions to the language of physical causality 
cannot be made on strictly scientific grounds for 
consubstantiality is not an empirical fact. It rather 
implies faith in the existence of the universe, or 
the world where both words carry connotations 
of the overall totality and unity. It is this faith 
that delivers us the sense of the given when we 
use the term “universe” in the conditions when 
the givenness pertaining to the natural object is 
unattainable. Using Husserl’s words, “it is this 
universal ground of belief in a world which all 
praxis presupposes, not only the praxis of life 
but also the theoretical praxis of cognition. … 
Consciousness of the world is consciousness in 
the mode of certainty of belief; it is not acquired 
by a specific act which breaks into the continuity 
of life as an act which posits being or grasps the 
existent or even as an act of judgement which 
predicates existence. All of these acts already 
presuppose consciousness of the world in the 
certainty of belief.” (Husserl,1973, p. 30).49 These 
beliefs correspond to that which in the natural 
attitude can be described as empty and never 
fulfilled intentions. Then the very tendency to 
transform the language of intentions into the 
language of physical causes in the context of the 
universe as a whole represents an attempt to make 
the universe a target of ever-going but unfulfilled 
intentions (C.f. Sokolowski, 2000, p. 43).
On the one hand the notion of the universe 
comes from astronomical observations and 
theories based in the ideal of physical causality; 
on the other hand we have some stories of the 
Big Bang and the universe’s facticity expressed 
in philosophical enquiries and scientific-
mythological narratives guided by the language 
of intentions and having origination in the human 
condition. This all suggests that either region in 
cosmological discourse (its observational base as 
well as eidetic extrapolations) encompasses the 
other; in other words, each type of cosmological 
understanding accounts for the hidden unity 
of both intentionalities dwelling in one and the 
same human person who discloses the universe. 
Put differently, cosmological theories need inputs 
from existential faith and hence from philosophy 
(regulative ideals in a Kantian sense), whereas 
philosophical imagination in the creation narrative 
borrows and exploits, for its “visualisation”, 
physico-mathematical images thus offering a 
metaphysical extension of physics. 50
One now anticipates that any attempt of 
totalising the world view, that is making a unique 
and consistent whole in our perception of the 
universe, is doomed to fail. All these attempts 
start from within the life-world associated with 
a geocentric world, and it is the life world which 
remains patchy and incoherent through different 
articulations including not only philosophical and 
scientific, but also religious ones. In other words, 
the life world does not allow its totalisation 
either through the language of matter and body 
or that of spirit and soul, through physical causes 
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or through human intentions because it is the 
world of historically contingent events whose 
instantiation is not subject to the physical or 
purely spiritual.51 The reality of the life world is 
far too existentially complex to allow a simple-
minded reduction to either one of these. This 
implies that cosmology has to deal with this 
intrinsic dualism between its orientation towards 
the natural sciences and, at the same time, its 
dependence upon the dimensions of human 
life. One must then expect that the discursive 
language of physical causation as a mode of 
thematisation of the life-world will go side by 
side with the “language of communion” and the 
excess of intuition over reason, so that neither of 
them will be able to reduced to the other. Every 
attempt to semantically transgress the normalised 
sense-borders of everyday intentional life in 
the conditions of inescapable communion with 
the universe, by the use of causally reductive 
language which sees that universe in stages of 
evolution and hierarchy of objects, issues in a 
counter-sense. The same holds for attempts to 
transgress the causal domain with intentional 
language: intentional language is useful to 
analyse and refer causal language to existential 
motivations of research, but not to the truth of a 
fact, which causal language attempts to affirm. 
As an example of how the language of 
intentionality takes control over the language of 
causality one can refer to the analogy between 
the phenomenology of birth (as absolute coming 
into being of a new hypostatic existence) and the 
phenomenology of the Big Bang: in both cases 
the “event” of birth and the origin of the universe 
are phenomenologically concealed because of the 
immanence of human life to itself as well as to 
the universe: one cannot transcend one’s own life 
or the universe in order to “look” at their origin 
from outside. However this analogy, originating 
essentially at the level of intentionality, does not 
cascade towards the explanatory level of physical 
causation. It just points towards the fundamental 
limit in attempting to assign physical causation 
to the event of origination of the universe which 
originates from the fact of human embodiment in 
the universe.52 
This analogy between the phenomenology 
of birth and the origin of the universe elucidates, 
in a non-trivial way, the sense of communion 
with the universe.53 By referring to the mystery 
of origin of every particular personal existence, a 
physical problem of comprehending the temporal 
origin of the universe is transformed into a purely 
philosophical problem of the contingency of this 
origin, that is the problem of the sufficient ground 
for the whole temporal span of the universe. Using 
the analogy with famous Kantian antinomies one 
can say that the classical paradox of the temporal 
origin of the universe formulated by Kant in his 
first cosmological antinomy is shifted toward 
the antinomy of the absolutely necessary being 
as if it is the ground of the visible universe.54 
This transformation, which is not a result of the 
advance of the physical sciences but the work 
of the intentionality enquiring into the ground 
of its own facticity and hence the facticity of 
the universe, demonstrates that from within 
this intentionality the problem of the temporal 
origin of the universe and its explication through 
evolutionary stages is irrelevant for any attempt 
to understand the universe’s facticity.55 The 
analogy with the phenomenological concealment 
of the origin of personal consciousness is 
crucial here. When achieving such a state of 
consciousness, when all the historical, temporal 
and spatial contingent aspects of the universe 
are reduced, this consciousness has to embrace 
itself to the uncertain infinity of its own being. 
Being absolute as an event of existence, every 
personal consciousness treats itself as indefinite 
and commensurable with the universe, where the 
commensurability manifests itself as an intuition 
of co-existence with the universe, which is not 
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fulfilled through acts of reason in spatial and 
temporal distinctions. According to G. Marcel’s 
thought expressed at the beginning of the 20th 
century, “the universe as such, not being thought 
of or able to be thought of as an object, has 
strictly speaking no past: it entirely transcends 
what I called a ‘cinematographic’ representation. 
And the same is true of myself: on a certain level 
I cannot fail to appear to myself as contemporary 
with the universe (coaevus universo), that is, as 
eternal” (Marcel, 1965, p. 24). Marcel anticipates 
here a simple truth that for every human being 
the sense of communion with the universe 
makes existentially irrelevant any notion of 
evolution and stage-by-stage description of the 
universe (‘cinematographic’ representation).56 
Communion is here and now and it is absolute 
in its transcendent phenomenality as an event of 
life; in other words it is the facticity of life that 
retains transcendence of that with which and in 
which this life is as communion. Life implies 
internal time consciousness, its unending 
inevitability, but being integrated in one and the 
same person this consciousness is not obliged to 
be projected on the physical extension of time. If 
the universe in its phenomenality appears to be 
a stable and enduring background of existence 
then a human being as a communicant with 
the universe realises itself as commensurable 
with it and hence also co-eternal with it. One 
can say that human beings as long as they are 
alive experience the immanence of the infinite. 
The life of a human being is then an act of 
communion, an event whose fullness (perceived 
through the sense of living being) does not need 
any acknowledgement of history of the universe, 
although the impossibility of grasping the sense 
of facticity of this life perceived through the 
immanence remains the unavoidable negative 
certitude of a theological kind. Within the fact 
of life it is the universe that becomes a part of 
existential history of every human being and not 
vice versa.57 Thus the identity of the universe 
which receives its fulfilment in acts of communion 
with persons, transcends any phenomenalisation 
of the universe (as its representation) through 
cosmology.58 However one must admit that the 
irrelevance of the non-lived cosmic history for 
a particular event of life does not entail the 
irrelevance of the human history as related to 
lived moments and memories imbued with a 
sense of telos related to the infinite tasks of 
humanity. 
What happens in cosmology then is that 
physicists’ intentionality (that is that one which 
pertained to the natural attitude) breaks the 
noetico-noematic (subject-object) inseparability 
and explicates the event of communion with the 
universe through creating theoretical models 
of the universe. By being in communion the 
knowing subject, a cosmologist, articulates the 
universe as a sort of “out there” which allegedly 
follows the objective laws of physics and thus is 
independent of a cosmologist’s insight. Such a 
scientific notion of the universe naturally falls 
under the phenomenological critique which 
reinstates back a simple truth that any truth of 
the universe is an articulated truth, so that this 
truth is in man and his body, the body which 
is consubstantial to the universe and communes 
with it. Thus one comes back to the inevitability 
of the link between the universe and man in a 
deep philosophical sense. However, and this 
is important for us, this intertwining between 
man and the universe does not deprive the 
universe of independence from the conditions 
of its expression by the human subjectivity. The 
universe as communion, denying any complete 
synthesis in its phenomenalisation, always 
retains that overwhelming presence which cannot 
be conditioned by the rubrics of subjectivity, 
inducing an excess of intuition over any attempt 
to see or constitute them. Thus the universe 
appeals to man as a saturated phenomenon 
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always retaining its own transcendence with 
respect to all attempts of humanity to grasp the 
sense of its facticity.59 
In conclusion one has to confirm the main 
thought of this paper that there is an obvious 
and probably unavoidable tension between 
the representation of the universe as an object 
in cosmology and its presence in existential 
communion which affects all our attempts to 
express the experience of living in the universe. 
To avoid this tension, one has to step into a 
dispassionate phenomenological description of 
the universe as it discloses itself in the natural 
attitude, in the language of causes on the one hand 
and in the language of intentional immanence 
through communion on the other hand. One might 
say that the ontological commitment should be left 
out and a certain phenomenological calm must be 
adopted with respect to various languages used 
for assessing the universe as a whole. This means 
that one can use discoveries achieved by natural 
scientific reduction as well as by philosophical 
insight and communion without committing 
semantically or ontologically to one region’s 
priority over the other. The same idea can be 
expressed differently: the cosmological narrative 
follows either the logic of physical causes and is 
shaped by mathematics aiming at pure objectivity 
or, alternatively, the “logic” of life and inseparable 
communion with the universe (which is not 
subject to intellectual persuasion and thus is the 
free-willing employment of artistic expression), 
which is ever incomplete (metaphorical) and 
fundamentally open-ended. It is because of 
this dichotomy that one must learn how to live 
with incomplete wholes, partial and shattered 
totalities – totalities requiring different languages 
although, after all, belonging to one culture.60 
Correspondingly the objective of a philosophical 
insight in cosmology, undertaken here, is not to 
find a unified language for understanding the 
universe, but rather to realise that in our approach 
to its totality, always initiated in the life-world, we 
progress by the various ways given to humanity. 
The reality of the universe then is much more 
than is met by the discursive mind, it forms a 
mysterious sense of “identity”, which is intuited, 
but never completely grasped by the mind: it 
bedazzles us, while constituting our own sense of 
identity to the extent that we cannot circumscribe 
the universe in the rubrics of thought. In its 
perennial leap towards understanding the sense 
of the universe, humanity stretches its capacity to 
grasp itself. Indeed, ontologically, the universe we 
disclose through our embodiment involves us as 
disclosing it. Given this our personhood achieves 
its status as a “place” that permits disclosure of 
the universe through what this personhood is. 
The I as person discloses, by being structured 
by disclosure itself, that is, in the words of M. 
Merleau-Ponty, by being a “concrete emblem of 
general manner of being” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 
p. 147).
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1 One can say, by using terms of J. L. Marion, that for cosmology as a scientific discipline it is typical to function in con-
ditions of “positive incertitude”, that is asserting things provisionally, which certainty will be complemented by new 
experimental and theoretical results, or even replaced by a more powerful scientific paradigm. Here lies the paradox 
of scientific cosmology’s functioning: on the one hand it delivers truth about partial objects, but still provides only a 
provisional truth with respect to the universe as a whole. And it is this positive incertitude which as such forms the 
condition of cosmology’s (and in general science’s) progress. In contrast, if one approaches cosmology from a philo-
sophical dimension, it becomes clear that philosophy was “certain” about general aspects of predicating the universe 
for centuries (remember, for example, Kant’s analysis of the cosmological idea in order to realise that its actuality has 
not been extinguished after nearly a century of scientific cosmology). The perennial problem of the universe’s facticity, 
that is its being, has not been removed from the philosophical scene in spite of desperate attempts of the apologists of 
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the multiverse and the Theory of Everything to remove this problem on the grounds of the immanent science. In this 
sense philosophy works in the conditions of the “certitude negative” which recognises that there are certain aspects of 
experience which are subject to discussion and explanation. The universe as donation and event in any life, as the begin-
ning and end, as being and meaning, cannot be explicated in terms of positive definitions. In this sense Ellis’ recourse 
to uncertainty and untestability of cosmology represents an intellectual move towards the “negative certitude”. See 
(Marion, 2010). 
2 Apart from using the adjective “untestable” 17 times in Ellis’ paper, one can find many propositions in which the words 
“unprovable” or “improbable” are used as characteristics of theories which represent a main stream of cosmology. This 
wording is used in both cases whether one speaks about the state of affairs in our universe (e.g. “the deduction of spatial 
homogeneity follows not directly from astronomical data, but because we add to the observations a philosophical principle 
that is plausible but untestable”(Ellis, 2007, p. 1226) or if one speculates about the so called multiverse when one attempts 
to predicate other worlds in terms of that one which is ours (e.g. “multiverse proposals are unprovable by observation or 
experiment….”, (Ellis, 2007, p. 1263). 
3 One can remember of Husserl’s famous criticism of the radical mathematisation of nature on the grounds that mathemat-
ics, as a method providing a certain result of mathematical representation of nature was taken for reality of this nature. 
Husserl writes: “Mathematics and mathematical science, as a garb of ideas, or the garb of symbols of the symbolic math-
ematical theories, encompasses everything which, for scientists and the educated generally, represents the life-world, 
dresses it up as “objectively actual and true” nature. It is through the garb of ideas that we take for true being what is 
actually a method – a method which is designed for the purpose of progressively improving, in infinitum, through “scien-
tific” predictions, those rough predictions which are the only ones originally possible within the sphere of what is actually 
experienced and experienceable in the life-world.” (E. Husserl, 1970, p. 51-52.)
4 One can generalise this thought by asserting the historical contingency of the conditions of disclosure in cosmology, that 
is of the historical relativising a-priori as relative to a certain situation of cosmology changing from one step to another of 
its history. It is this positive incertitude of cosmological research that guarantees its progress and at the same time makes 
it radically different in comparison with a “negative certitude” of philosophical insights in the topic of the universe or the 
world. According to the spirit of the volume on transcendentalism in modern physics (Bitbol et al, 2009, p. 13) the histori-
cal relativising of the conditions of cosmological knowledge could extend the Kantian understanding of constraints on 
knowledge, as transferred from a-historical a-priories to ever corrigible conditions of constitution of reality related to the 
evolving human condition. 
5 Up to some extent this is true even in the case when the experiments are anticipated through theory and thus planned in 
advance within a given paradigmatic constraint. The resistance of the universe to its disclosure makes these experiments 
amendable and corrigible because their outcomes are still contingent. 
6 One implies here a change in the conditions of constitution which are not related to the instrumental requirements and 
means of accessibility. As an example one can refer to changes of theoretical paradigms which have philosophical motiva-
tions; a typical example follows from a philosophical desire to explain away the problem of the contingency of the initial 
conditions which results in inflationary cosmological scenarios or ideas of the multiverse.
7 C.f. (Ellis, 2007, p.1221).
8 Husserl defines humanity as mankind with infinite tasks as a carrier of philosophy, conceptions of ideas through which 
“man gradually becomes a new man”, man who “lives toward poles of infinity.” Infinite tasks are associated with the 
theoretical attitude to the world. In this sense science itself signifies the idea of the infinity of tasks. See (Husserl, 1970, 
pp. 277-279.)
9 The creation of a cosmic narrative implies a deviation from the egocentric intentionalities which could be criticised by the 
philosophers of existence, who believed that it was wrong to interrogate the sense of the given facticity; on the contrary 
their philosophy takes this facticity for granted as an undeniable premise of all other enquiries. 
10 See in this respect a paper (Tegmark, 2008), in which the author attempts to advocate an extreme view of mathematics as an 
underlying structure of reality, that is as reality itself, which is stripped off of all aspects of the human presence. However the 
hypothesis of the mathematical universe suffers from not being placed in the context of a serious philosophical discussion 
on realism in mathematics (such as given in, for example in (Balaguer, 2009), not to speak of a phenomenological stance 
on mathematics. In addition one must say that the claim that the universe is mathematical, which in the paper of Tegmark 
is tantamount to assertion of the universe’s epistemic exhaustability (that is knowability), contrasts with understanding 
that mathematical concepts have no intuitive content and are very poor in donation thus leaving behind all aspects of 
experience of the universe which, on the contrary, are so powerful in donation, that they block any pregiven structure of 
the discursive reason and constitute it to the extent this reason cannot cope with the saturation of the intuition. (See in 
this respect (Marion, 2002a, pp. 179-247). In simple words, all extreme views of mathematical realism assume that if the 
universe is only physical, then it must be mathematical. However, it is here, that philosophers could raise a serious doubt on 
whether the physical and hence mathematical representation of the universe exhausts the sense of its reality as perceived 
by human beings. 
11 The fact that cosmology involves a “computational synthesis” of the observable astronomical phenomena implies that 
physical objectivity of these phenomena as well as of the universe as a whole cannot be tantamount to an ontology of 
some independent reality. The possibility of a complete mathematical reconstruction of such an ontological reality would 
ascribe to the human mind excessive intellectual capacities which transcend its finitude following from the limits of 
embodiment. Correspondingly, according to H. Weyl’s qualification, cosmology here concedes to idealism (we would 
say transcendental idealism) in the sense that “its objective reality is not given but to be constructed…, and that it cannot 
be constructed absolutely, but only in relation to an arbitrarily assumed coordinate system and in mere symbols”. (Weyl, 
2009, p. 117).
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12 Here is the full version of his theses A1 and A2: (A1) “The universe itself cannot be subjected to physical experimentation. 
We cannot re-run the universe with the same or altered conditions to see what would happen if they were different, so we 
cannot carry out scientific experiments on the universe itself”; (A2) “The universe cannot be observationally compared 
with other universes.  We cannot compare the universe with any similar object, nor can we test our hypotheses about it by 
observations determining statistical properties of a known class of physically existing universes.” (Ellis, 2007, p. 1216). 
13 These existential inspirations initiate generic cosmological mythology which has already been described in terms of 
cosmogenesis, that is how the world was made, how the present universe which stands before our eyes developed from 
what went before, from the non-universe, the formless. C.f. (Ladrière, 1972, p. 153.)
14 This thought was expressed in numerous ways by philosophers and scientists. See in this respect, for example, (Minkowski, 
1970, p. 244), (Munitz, 1951, p. 338), (Brockelman, 1999, p. 42), (Primack, Abrams, 2006, pp. 280-290).
15 Compare with P. Heelan: “By studying the forms of objectivity assumed to be present in nature, one can, however, infer 
the forms of subjectivity that are presupposed. Inquiry of this kind must proceed according to phenomenological method, 
the purpose of which is to uncover the noetic pole constitutive with the noematic pole, of the noetic-noematic (subject-
object) intentionality structure within which the form of the question and the form of the answer mulually determine one 
another.” (Heelan, 1972, p. 486); also: “We can enhance the sense of ourselves, as we’ve been successfully doing with our 
other senses, by means of a scientific but nevertheless metaphorical telescope- a new cosmological lens through which we 
can see how the expanding universe really works and how astoundingly special our place is in it” (Primack, Abrams,2006, 
p. 282). Placed in a cosmological context the following quotation from F. O’Murchadha points to the same thought: “The 
otherness of nature is beyond us, beyond our humanity, beyond history. Yet it is in a place carved out of nature that we 
dwell. In dwelling – as ethical being – we become what we are. Hence, how our dwelling is conceived, how the relation of 
the history of this dwelling to the natural environment, through which it is carved out, occurs, relates directly to who we 
are.” (O’Murchadha, 1995, p. 189).
16 One can make a parallel between our phenomenological interest and a similar approach to philosophical issues of physics 
which is developed in the movement called “formalised epistemology”. (See, for example, (Bailly, 2002, pp. 3-8). However, 
the reduction performed in the “formalised epistemology” does not reach the goal of this research which aims not only to 
explicate the cognitive structures underlying science, but also attempts to relate them to fundamental existential conditions 
predetermining their facticity.
17 (Husserl, 1970, p. 237). However the converse is not true, that is the cultural sciences cannot be given a place among the 
natural sciences. See in this respect (Gurwitsch, 1974, pp. 148-49). 
18 Here it is appropriate to point to a certain similarity between the phenomenology of birth and theories of the beginning of 
the universe as related to a general problem of consciousness’ facticity. See (Nesteruk, 2008, pp. 247-250.) In the natural 
attitude the same problem can be addressed under the name of genetic similarity between the biology of birth and the 
stages of development of the universe See (Pavlenko, 2003, pp. 47-48) ; 2004, pp. 389-401). The views on the universe were 
always important for communities to draw some remote expectations having ethical character: ethics depends on the idea 
of environment and its developmental perspective. (See in this respect (Mathews, 1991, pp. 3-6). 
19 The constitution of one’s ego through knowledge so that the “object” of this knowledge is formed together with its subject 
represents a crucial feature of the human sciences. According to M. Bakhtin, the object which is studied in the human sci-
ences belongs to the same realm as the subject who studies, and thus it is no less active than the knowing subject (Bakhtin, 
1979, p. 349). In this context it is interesting to make a reference to J. A. Wheeler who affirmed a similar thing with no 
recourse to the human sciences. For example: “In giving meaning to the universe, the observer gives meaning to himself, 
as part of that universe” (Patton, Wheeler, 1977, p. 31). That is, by disclosing the universe the observer forms its own 
structures of subjectivity which apprehend the universe. 
20 The opposite would imply sheer idealism, resulting in the universe to be an intelligible entity graspable through the 
already formed intellect. The universe would be thought as pre-existent, but intelligible, Platonic-like entity. Its grasp, 
would imply a sheer mysticism as the communion with the realm which is beyond the empirical (this mysticism is similar 
to that one which is envisaged in the Platonic philosophy of mathematics). Even if one would allow for a complete com-
putational synthesis of the universe, this would, as we mentioned above, exceed human finite capacities limited to the 
conditions of embodiment. The desire to know the universe in its totality (as “all in all”) brings to mind eschatological 
connotations as if the thinking of totality of the physical universe is equivalent to the anticipation of the eschaton in which 
the overall transfiguration of the world and human beings will allow one to see the universe from the perspective of the 
trans-worldly existence. 
21 H. Weyl linked the human longing for the sense of the infinite with that moral and human standard by which all human 
deeds are judged: “…mind is freedom within the limitations of existence; it is open towards the infinite.… The completed 
infinite we can only represent in symbols. From this relationship every creative act of man receives its deep consecration 
and dignity.” (Weyl, 2009a, p. 82). 
22 Here one must agree with Ellis that the fact that cosmologists write about contentious issues in cosmology “is proof that 
they consider it meaningful to argue about such issues” because their quality emerges naturally from knowledge of the 
physical universe (Ellis, 2007, p. 1272).
23 Here one means the so called cosmic philosophies and ideologies of the ancient past which aspired for humanity to be dis-
solved in cosmic immensities and which were strongly dismissed by the ecclesial authorities as pagan and gnostic. 
24 J. Moltmann, by formulating the quest for the sense of cosmic utopia which creates in us the interest to know the universe, 
summarises that all that which the vast science-fiction tells can be reduced to the following: the infinite survival of human-
kind and unlimited development of human consciousness (Moltmann, 2003, p. 72.) 
25 E. Fromm, for example, speaks about existential and historical dichotomies in man. Existential dichotomies are related 
to man self-questioning the sense of its own existence: “ Man is the only animal which can be bored, that can be discon-
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tended, that can feel evicted from paradise. Man is the only animal for whom his own existence is a problem which he 
has to solve and from which he cannot escape.” These are dichotomies about life and death, loneliness and relatedness, 
individuality and sociality. Because of their free will man can attempt to annul historical contradictions through their 
actions, but it is futile to overcome existential contradictions, man remains dissatisfied, anxious and restless. Then “there 
is only one solution to his problem: to face truth, to acknowledge his fundamental aloneness and solitude in the universe 
indifferent to his fate, to recognise that there is no power transcending him which can solve his problem for him” (Fromm, 
1967, pp. 41-44).
26 As eloquently expressed by H. Küng there is no intellectual compulsion in questions beyond empirical reality, but freedom 
dominates in them (Küng, 2007, p. 78). Here comes to mind an analogy with the Kantian aesthetical ideas which, being 
qualified as unexpoundable presentations of imagination function according to “ free play” (Kant, 2005, p. 142). The anal-
ogy is that the question about the invisible foundation of the universe falls under the rubric of aesthetical idea, rather than 
rational idea. 
27 This argument corresponds to what is generally called anthropic inference in cosmology, namely a very delicate interplay 
between the physical and biological parameters of human existence and large-scale properties of the universe as well as 
fundamental physical constants. It is important to realise that this inference does not account for the facticity of human-
ity’s existence, because it does not cover the realm of sufficient conditions which belong to the sphere of human morality 
and conscious will. Indeed the technological advance of humanity threatens its local survival on the planet without af-
fecting the global physical properties in the world. This implies that the actual presence of humanity in the universe as 
an ongoing event is determined by human wisdom and morality rather than simply by the cosmic conditions. See, e.g., 
(Leslie, 1996), (Rees, 2003.) 
28 The assertion of the morality of the universe advocated in the book (Murphy, Ellis, 1996; in particular p. 207) does not 
have any straightforward scientific reference, for “free will” as well as the very facticity of consciousness in the universe 
cannot be accounted through any reduction to the physical or biological. One can add to this that the very existence of 
cosmology as a free and creative questioning of the universe is thus inherent in the fact of free human choice to explore 
the world at large. The initiation of cosmology lies in the freely made decision to act and exceed the limitedness of the 
empirically given. And this free decision as such is not subject to a scientific account. 
29 As an example one can point to M. Tegmark who conjectured a principle of “mathematical democracy” according to which 
whatever is mathematical is also physical. (Tegmark, 2003, pp. 480-85). The reader should remember, however, that the 
main issue here is whether the mathematical exhausts the whole of reality. One can adopt a different view on mathematical 
models of the universe regarding them as related not to one and the same physical original. In this case a cosmological 
model consistent from the mathematical point of view can give images of that which cannot be physical in this universe. In 
spite of this all mathematical models being created in this universe contribute in a sort of way to its articulated content. 
30 See a book of (Bowker, 2005, pp. 118-148), in which the author persuasively argues on the importance of coherence consid-
erations in science (and religion) as a different form of justification in comparison with the correspondence principle. On 
the limited application of the idea of coherence of epistemic justification in cosmology see (Nesteruk, 2008, pp. 244-46; 
2009, pp. 71-75). 
31 Cf. (Bitbol, et al., 2009, p. 4).
32 This allows one to make a certain analogy between the forming of sense in cosmology and theology: indeed theology 
forms its sense of truth not through empirical references to the Divine, but through the experience of God as elaborated 
and established ecclesial agreement. See, for example, (Nesteruk, 2008, pp. 244-46).
33 G. Ellis underlines the essential characteristic of cosmology’s proper subject matter: “..if we convince ourselves that some 
large scale physical phenomenon essentially occurs only once in the entire universe, then it should be regarded as part of 
cosmology proper; whereas if we are convinced it occurs in many places or times, even if we cannot observationally access 
them…then study of that class of object or events can be distinguished from cosmology proper precisely because there is 
a class of them to study”, (Ellis, 2007, p. 1219). This careful distinction is related to the universe as a whole and makes a 
clear-cut demarcation line between cosmology proper and other celestial sciences like astronomy and astrophysics. 
34 This would correspond to a Platonic treatment of the construct of the universe as an idea. In this case cosmology were 
to face, in analogy with the general Platonic stance in the philosophy of mathematics, a serious problem of justifying the 
interaction between the universe as an intelligible entity and its empirical appearance to embodied consciousness, the 
interaction which would imply a sort of mystical communion. (See in this context a nice discussion on the status of math-
ematical objects and their knowability in (Tieszen, 2005, pp. 46-68.)
35 C.f. (Marcel, 1965, p. 24). 
36 One can argue that the very process of invocation of other worlds is reminiscent of that which phenomenology calls 
“eidetic variation”. One subjects the physical parameters of the universe to a sort of variation whose ultimate goal is to 
establish the stability or the eidos of the actual universe. 
37 C.f. (Gurwitsch, 1974, pp. 44-45). See also (Husserl, 1970, p. 227) on the “nature” as correlate of a universal abstraction.
38 A similar observation, with no recourse to phenomenology and the concept of intentionality, has been made by a Rus-
sian philosopher V. Rosin. See, for example, (Rosin, 2000, p. 81). In another paper he writes: “The object of cosmology 
(in analogy with the objects of biology, cultural sciences and sociology) cannot be described within a single scientific 
discipline….From the point of view of the philosophy of science the universe represents an ideal object of theories 
pertaining to the human sciences, based in its construction in facts (astronomical observations and their interpreta-
tion) and related to the process of realisation of cosmologists’ values and approaches, as well as to the discourse of the 
human sciences (for example the treatment of astronomical observations as characteristic texts and activity of the Cos-
mos)….(Rosin, 2007, pp. 111-128). Rosin makes his claims on the human-sciences’ nature of cosmological knowledge 
by referring to works of another Russian philosopher V. Kazyutinski, in particular to his paper “Worlds of culture and 
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world of science: an epistemological status of cosmology” in (Kazyutinsky, 1998, pp. 101-118). However Kazyutinski 
himself objects to Rozin’s strong claims on the status of cosmology as a human science. See (Kazyutinsky, 2007, 
pp. 125-129).
39 C.f. (Harvey, 1995, p. 122).
40 Cosmological research is driven by cultural and social factors, even by fashion. See, for example, (Penrose, 2005, pp. 1017-
20). 
41 E. Husserl accentuated a feature of “corporeity” which physics (as a typical representative of the natural sciences) only 
wants to see in that world from which this same physics originates, that is the life-world: “The natural science of the mod-
ern period, establishing itself as physics, has its roots in the consistent abstraction through which it wants to see, in the 
life-world only corporeity. Each “thing” “has” corporeity even though, if it is (say) a human being or a work of art, it is not 
merely bodily but is only “embodied”, like everything real.” (Husserl, 1970, p. 227).
42 An attempt like this can be found in M. Tegmark’s approach for whom the epistemic exhaustibility of the physical 
universe is equivalent to its description in a purely mathematical form devoid of “human baggage”. See (Tegmark, 
2008).
43 That fact that intentionality plays here a pivotal role can be realised through an observation that a cluster of galaxies as 
a correlate of this intentionality remains unfulfilled on the level of physical causality. A cluster cannot be conceived as a 
physical system or object whose components are in physical interaction which are constitutive of this object. There is no 
“body” of the cluster of galaxies in the same way as there is a body of a train whose appearance through its front entails 
the assurance in its physical objectivity as a “solid body” localised in space and time. One can conjecture that the question 
of existence of such objects as clusters of galaxies is established through insistence on their epistemic identity and not 
space-time attributes. 
44 This resonates with Ellis’s qualification that “cosmology is both a geographic and a historical science combined into one: 
we see distant sources at an earlier epoch, when their properties may have been different.”(Ellis, 2007, p. 1221). 
45 Characteristically the work of intentionality presupposes a sort of transcendence. Intentionality gazes beyond things’ 
appearance, transcends the visible towards a non-visible, that is towards that which is not reducible to the visible and yet 
that which is the condition of it. Intentionality thus implies a speculative transcendence similar to that one of creative 
mythology inherent in the very human condition and may be having an evolutionary importance. The appeal to the past 
of the universe which “unites” the phenomenal in some unformed and undifferentiated matter means at the same time the 
invocation of the original time which in its actuality is infinitely far away but still active and present as an open-ended 
fulfilment. Being non-human this past is in radical discontinuity with this world, but it serves as a productive act in relation 
to the visible world, that is as the world at distance, that distance which can be crossed over but not immanently overcome. 
The transcendence in this case is a free flight from the possible to that which is the condition of any possible. At the same 
time transcendence is not arbitrary fantasy and a lapse into the inarticulate, it is the intentional thematisation of that which 
makes the universe a unity, that is, in an ancient Greek parlance, the cosmos. 
46 This fact is related to the potentially infinite geometry of space and the finitude of the speed of light. Since we observe the 
universe along the past light cone which imposes constraints on the maximal distance causally connected with the earth 
bound point of observation, we are not only detached from all regions which are beyond this light cone, but event within 
this light cone we effectively receive signals from regions which, according to the standard model of cosmology, have been 
disconnected in the past. This constitutes a famous horizon problem, whose alleged solution was assigned to inflationary 
cosmology. (Weinberg, 2008, pp. 205-6). 
47 One must not understand substance straightforwardly in the style of an old fashion metaphysics. When, for example we 
talk about the unity of the universe in the Big Bang, we assume a sort of unified field which contains potentially all dif-
ferentiated objects. This assumption, for example, corresponds to an old Greek idea of “water” as that underlying agency 
which gives rise to all varied forms of matter. 
48 The examples of such diagram can be found in many standard books on cosmology; see, for example, (Harrison, 2000, pp. 
345-55).
49 One must be aware, however, that Husserl’s usage of the term “world” does not correspond exactly to what is meant here 
by the universe. He does not reduce the meaning of the world to the all-encompassing extended spatiality and temporality, 
but rather means the world as an irreducible context of all experience, as the “horizon of all horizons” in all intentional 
acts. See in this respect a classical paper (Landgrebe, 1958).
50 As an example of such a metaphysical extension of cosmology one can point to diagrams which recapitulate the wholeness 
of the universe (with some particular physical details) and its link to the fact that it is articulated by human beings. As an 
example one can point to a famous “closed circuit” in J. A. Wheeler’s writings symbolising the world as a self-synthesising 
system of existence. See e.g. (Wheeler, 1988, p. 5), or a picture of the so called “Cosmic Uroboros” E.g. (Primack, Abrams, 
2006, pp. 160, 284). These diagrams mean to stand for such a unity of the world in which the historically formulated physics 
is erected to the level of apodictic structure of being. One then understands the apophatic sense of these representations 
providing signifiers of the universe’s manifestation with no pretence for the exhaustion of the sense of that which is 
signified. 
51 As was argued by J. L. Marion by referring to Kant, unique occurring typical for historical phenomena do not fall under 
the rubric of analogies of experience which concern only a “fringe of phenomenality typical of the objects constituted by 
the sciences, a phenomenality that is poor in intuition. See (Marion, 2001, p. 204).
52 See more details in (Nesteruk, 2008, pp. 247-50). 
53 The sense of communion implied here exceeds its physical dimension of consubstantiality. The analogy which is 
developed by us differs from the hypothesis of “genetic similarity” between the evolution of the universe (cosmogenesis) 
and development of a human being (anthropogenesis) introduced by A. Pavlenko. See, for example, (Pavlenko, 2003, pp. 
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47-48; 2004, pp. 389-401); 2008, pp. 128-130).
54 This shift can be observed by analysing R. Penrose’s hypothesis on the origin of temporal irreversibility due to the local 
conditions and treated by him through a pseudo-theological metaphor. See (Penrose, 1989, pp. 435-447). See details in 
(Nesteruk, 1999, pp. 77-78; 2003, pp. 67-77).
55 If one thinks of the ontological “transcendental condition” for the possibility of consistent and varied processes in 
time in the universe, then no appeal can plausibly be made either to a set of fixed entities or to an ontic first cause 
since, within the material universe, neither the former nor the latter can “originally”, that is ontologically, precede 
what is caused. The notion of ‘cause’ is acting here as a pragmatic fiction which disguses the fact that ‘that which 
causes’ is only something which is changing into something else. In this sense all ultimate causes are more primarily 
effects, that is an effect is described as causatum (rather than as effectus). In different words one expresses the same 
by saying that “causing means giving” implying the cause is a going out of itself as an effect, while the effect is wholly 
‘from’ the cause in which it eminently abides. The sought explanation of the facticity of the universe thus implies the 
imminence of “givenness”, that is that donation of the universe which we receive. Correspondingly all conventional 
mythologies acting on the premise of imitating the other-worldly “origin” of the universe as a precondition for the 
unfolding temporal flux fail to address this contingency in an “explanatory” manner: they just imitate the mode of 
donation of the universe through the appeal to creative power of imagination which allegedly refers to realities beyond 
the facticity of the donation. In other words, the donation itself is explicated in terms of layers and strata of this same 
donation which is not perceived as manifested. 
56 The so called “cinematographic representation of the universe” (the term which goes back to H. Bergson) is irrelevant 
in the approach of communion even in spite of a trivial intuition that all material constituents of communicants contain 
elements of the historical past of the universe. Through its past the active communion with the universe manifests itself as 
being present in us in every cell and every breath. 
57 This observation corresponds to a phenomenological stance on physical time as originating in the subjective time as well 
as in the internal time consciousness. See (Husserl, 1991). It also connotes with a problem of constitution of the sense of 
history in transcendental ego. See in this respect (Ricoeur, 1967, pp. 145-150).
58 The epistemological dichotomy between communion and discursive representation of the universe implied here can be 
expressed as the opposition between subjective absolute and objective relative mentioned by H. Weyl in reference to M. 
Born: “The immediate experience [as communion, A.N.] is subjective and absolute. …The objective world, on the other 
hand with which we reckon continually in our daily lives and which the natural sciences attempt to crystallise…is of 
necessity relative [this relativity is first of all related to its historical contingency, A.N.]; it can be represented by definite 
things (numbers or other symbols) only after a system of coordinates has been arbitrarily [that is historically contingently, 
A. N.] carried into the world….Whoever desires the absolute must take the subjectivity and egocentricity into the bargain; 
whoever feels drawn toward the objective faces the problem of relativity” (H. Weyl, 2009b, p. 116.)
59 The notion of the “saturated phenomenon” was introduced by J. L. Marion in his paper (Marion, 2001), and developed 
further in his books (Marion, 2002a,b). The application of the idea of saturated phenomena in cosmology is undertaken by 
A. Nesteruk in his paper (Nesteruk, 2010, pp. 186-189). 
60 C.f. (Harvey, 1995, p. 133). See also (Papin, 1992). The implied diversity and plurality, as a valid approach to knowledge 
of the universe, brings to a characteristic expression that, in cosmology, all signifiers in our experience of the universe do 
not exhaust that which is signified. As was conjectured by D. Bohm and D. Peat, each scientific theory bears the inscription 
“this is not a universe” meaning that “every kind of thought, mathematics included, is an abstraction which does not and 
cannot cover the whole of reality” and this is why “perhaps every theory of the universe should have in it the fundamental 
statement ‘this is not a universe’” (Bohm, Peat, 1987, pp. 8-9).
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Космология на перекрестке естественных  
и гуманитарных наук: возможна ли демаркация?  
Часть 2. Экспликация
А.В. Нестерук 
Университет Портсмута 
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Это вторая часть статьи по проблеме демаркации естественных и гуманитарных наук в 
современной космологии. В этой части мы эксплицируем далее смысл неких положений 
космологии, предпринимая феноменологический анализ. В частности, мы подробно анализируем 
смысл того факта, что современная космология функционирует в условиях непроверяемости 
ее теорий. Мы предлагаем гипотезу о том, что де факто современная космология работает 
в такой эпистемологической парадигме, которая не присуща естествознанию, а именно в 
парадигме так называемой когерентности объяснения, не требующей ссылок на эмпирический 
опыт и вырабатывающей критерий истинности теорий и смысл соответствующих им 
реальностей на основе группового, профессионального соглашения. Соответственно это 
усиливает наш аргумент в пользу того, что реальность того, что называется вселенной, 
то есть ее конструкт, еще больше зависит от структур человеческой субъективности, 
привнося в теорию элемент гуманитарных наук, а именно построение реальности не на 
основе физической каузальности, а на основе интенциональных актов сознания. Статья 
предлагает отказаться от претензий определенной онтологической установки в отношении 
конструктов космологии и взамен проводить беспристрастный феноменологический анализ, 
выявляющий взаимодействие каузальности и интенциональности в смыслополагающих актах. 
Соответственно задачей философского осмысления космологии становится не построение 
некого унифицированного языка описания, а равноправное включение различных методов 
описания вселенной в общую картину жизненного мира. Реальность вселенной оказывается 
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при этом гораздо шире, чем любая конечная модель ее «идентичности». Вселенная являет 
себя человеческому сознанию с такой силой, что последнее не способно конституировать 
ее. Наоборот, сама вселенная формирует структуры субъективности точно в той мере, в 
которой эго исследователя не способно ее понять. 
Ключевые слова: космология, феноменология, когерентность, нетестируемость, 
интенциональность, каузальность, субъективность.
